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tortions and nominal wage rigidity yields excessive inﬂation as monetary
policy tries to exploit nominal wage contracts to address labor-market dis-
tortions. An inﬂation target reduces inﬂation, but creates a conﬂict be-
tween monetary policy and discretionary ﬁscal policy if ﬁscal policy is set
at a higher frequency than nominal wages are. Preventing the associated
excessive accumulation of public debt calls for debt ceilings. If countries
diﬀer substantially in terms of structural distortions, uniform debt ceilings
must be complemented by country-speciﬁc debt targets in order to prevent
decentralized ﬁscal authorities from employing debt policy strategically.
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11. Introduction
The advent of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has given rise to a lively
debate about the appropriate relationship between centralized monetary policy,
on the one hand, and decentralized ﬁscal and structural policies, on the other
hand. Does the EMU require coordination of ﬁscal policies and, if so, what form
should such coordination take? This paper addresses these questions by investi-
gating how decentralized ﬁscal policy interacts with centralized monetary policy
and decentralized structural policies in the EMU. We discuss how the appropriate
institutional arrangements for ﬁs c a lp o l i c ys h o u l dd e p e n do nm o n e t a r ya r r a n g e -
ments (e.g. inﬂation targets), labor-market institutions (e.g. nominal wage rigid-
ity) and labor-market and product-market imperfections (e.g., taxes raising the
natural rate of unemployment).
The current institutional arrangements for ﬁscal policy in the EMU are as fol-
lows. The Maastricht Treaty formulates restrictions on public deﬁcits and public
debts that countries must meet before they can enter the EMU. In addition, the
Stability and Growth Pact constrains ﬁscal policy once countries have entered the
EMU and speciﬁes sanctions in case an EMU country violates these constraints.
1Finally, the Euro Group is the forum where the ﬁnance ministers of the EMU
countries informally discuss matters pertaining to ﬁscal policy on an ongoing ba-
sis. Especially France desires to endow this council with more formal powers so
that, as a European ﬁscal authority, it can provide some political counterweight
to the European Central Bank (ECB) (for example, see The Economist (2000)).
Our analysis is conducted in a two-period model of a monetary union where
decentralized ﬁscal authorities determine taxes, public spending and public debt.
The model accounts for labor-market distortions raising the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate above its ﬁrst-best level. Moreover, it models not only the impact
of these distortions on discretionary monetary policy, but also the relationship
between labor-market imperfections and ﬁscal policy by incorporating a direct
link between the tax burden and equilibrium unemployment. In this way, it in-
vestigates the relationships between three major policy areas (namely, monetary,
ﬁscal and structural policy) in a monetary union.
The model incorporates three imperfections in macroeconomic policymaking:
ﬁrst, discretion in monetary policymaking; second, discretion in ﬁscal policymak-
ing; and third, spillovers between decentralized ﬁscal policies within the union.
Discretionary monetary policy is a realistic description of European monetary pol-
icy. Although the ECB is one of the most statutorily independent central banks of
2the world, statutes alone cannot insulate the ECB entirely from political pressures.
This inﬂuence may be exercised both directly (e.g. by mobilizing public opinion)
and indirectly (e.g. through the appointment of ECB Board members or through
exchange rate policy, which remains the domain of the ECOFIN Council rather
than the ECB). Structural policies worsen the commitment problems facing the
ECB, as high unemployment intensiﬁes pressures on the ECB to relax monetary
policy. This is especially relevant in the European context, where serious labor-
market distortions give rise to high unemployment rates in several EMU countries.
Indeed, lack of monetary policy commitment interacts with nominal wage rigidity
and labor-market distortions to yield excessive inﬂation (see Barro and Gordon,
1983, and many subsequent papers — for example, Rogoﬀ (1985), Persson and
Tabellini (1993), Walsh (1995) and, more recently, Dixit and Lambertini (2000)).
Discretionary ﬁscal policy suﬀers from time inconsistency if it can be adjusted
while existing nominal wage and debt contracts remain in force. This is in fact
typically the case. To illustrate, whereas ﬁscal policy is usually set once a year,
the time to maturity of many nominal debt contracts is more than one year.
Also nominal wage contracts are ﬁxed for more than a year in several European
countries (e.g., Layard et al., 1991). Even if nominal contracts are renewed every
year, they are typically not renewed at the same time that ﬁscal policy is set for
3an e wﬁscal year. In order to explore the implications of time inconsistency in an
analytically tractable fashion, we assume that nominal wages are determined two
periods ahead while ﬁscal policy is adjusted in each period. Since ﬁscal policy
is thus adjusted more frequently than nominal wage contracts are, it faces an
incentive to exploit the predetermination of future nominal wages.
The third imperfection (i.e. spillovers between decentralized ﬁscal policymak-
ers) originates in international conﬂicts between heterogeneous countries about the
common monetary policy. Countries do not agree on the stance of monetary policy
if labor-market imperfections diﬀer across union members so that countries per-
ceive diﬀerent roles for monetary policy in addressing these imperfections. These
conﬂicts among decentralized ﬁscal authorities yield wasteful strategic interaction
in the form of strategic debt accumulation. Countries would be better oﬀ if they
could all credibly commit to an agreement not to engage in these strategic debt
policies.
We explore several institutional arrangements to address these three imperfec-
tions in macroeconomic policymaking within a monetary union. In particular, an
inﬂation target lends credibility to the commitment of the ECB to price stability,
thereby reducing inﬂation. Indeed, as part of its monetary policy strategy, the
ECB announced a medium-term target range for weighted average inﬂation of
40−2%. At the same time, however, a tight inﬂation target causes the preferences
of the monetary and ﬁscal authorities regarding monetary policy to diverge. In
the resulting conﬂict about the stance of monetary policy, the ﬁscal authorities
strategically boost debt accumulation to induce the central bank to relax future
monetary policy. A ceiling on public debt can resolve this policy conﬂict. The
conﬂict between heterogeneous countries about the proper stance of the common
monetary policy is addressed through country-speciﬁc debt targets. In this way,
countries in eﬀect commit to a contractual cooperative agreement not to impose
adverse externalities on each other. One can view this solution to international
spillovers as ex-ante coordination, i.e. coordinating ﬁscal policies before the pri-
vate sector commits to nominal wage contracts. Ex-ante coordination of ﬁscal
policy is thus unambiguously beneﬁcial.
In practice, debt ceilings are more diﬃcult to implement than inﬂation targets,
especially in a monetary union with sovereign countries. Indeed, the commitment
of EMU countries to the Stability and Growth Pact is often called into question
because the sanctions prescribed by the Pact are not so credible in the absence
of a European political union. In the absence of credible debt ceilings, optimal
inﬂation targets do not completely eliminate inﬂa t i o ni no r d e rt op r e v e n tw a s t e f u l
strategic debt accumulation by the ﬁscal authorities. Ex-post ﬁscal policy coor-
5dination, i.e. coordinating ﬁscal policy after nominal wage contracts have been
signed,1 resolves the conﬂict among the heterogeneous ﬁscal authorities about the
stance of the common monetary policy. In the presence of an inﬂation target,
however, this coordination worsens the conﬂict between monetary and ﬁscal pol-
icy by strengthening the strategic position of the ﬁscal authorities in their conﬂict
with the ECB. Accordingly, strategic debt accumulation aimed at inducing the
ECB to relax future monetary policy increases. Ex-post coordination of ﬁscal
policy may therefore harm welfare, especially if countries are rather homogeneous
so that international spillovers are only small. The ECB may thus justiﬁably fear
that a more prominent role for the Euro Group Council raises pressures to relax
monetary policy, especially if structural unemployment in Europe remains high
and the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact remains in doubt.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. We
keep the model as simple as possible in order to focus on the strategic interac-
tion between the central monetary policy of the ECB and decentralized ﬁscal and
structural policies. Section 3 explores the second best, which emerges if all pol-
icymakers can commit to their policies. Section 4 analyses the solution under
two-period ahead wage setting if policymakers cannot commit and inﬂation tar-
gets and debt targets are absent. Section 5 investigates ex-ante (through inﬂation
6and debt targets) and ex-post policy coordination, while Section 6 concludes the
main body of the paper. Finally, the derivations are contained in an appendix,
which is available upon request.
2. The model
The European monetary union (EMU), which is small relative to the rest of the
world, is formed by n countries. The European Central Bank (ECB) sets monetary
policy for the entire union. There are two periods.
Nominal wage setting takes place as follows, where we express wages and prices
in logs. Workers are represented by trade unions who aim for a target real wage
rate of zero in each period (e.g. see Alesina and Tabellini, 1987 and Jensen,
1994).2 For the ﬁrst period, they set the nominal wage w1 so as to minimize the
expected squared deviation of the realized real wage rate from this target. Hence,
they minimize E0 (w1 − p1)
2 over w1 at the start of the ﬁrst period, where E0 (.)
denotes a (rational) expectation taken at the start of the ﬁrst period and pt is the
price level in period t. This yields w1 =E0 (p1) so that w1 − p1 = −(π1 − E0π1),
where πt = pt − pt−1 is period- t inﬂation. Second-period nominal wages w2 are
determined two periods ahead by minimizing E0 (w2 − p2)
2 over w2 at the start
of the ﬁrst period. However, at the start of the second period, the nominal wages
7f o rt h a tp e r i o da r ei n d e x e df o ru n e x p e c t e di n ﬂa t i o ni n c u r r e do v e rt h eﬁrst period.
Therefore, the nominal wage rate in the second period is w2 =E0 (p2)+p1−E0 (p1),
implying that w2−p2 = −(π2 − E0π2). Hence, due to the indexation, the second-
period real wage is unaﬀected by ﬁrst-period inﬂation. The conventional wisdom
is that, compared to the U.S., European wages are relatively rigid in real terms
(e.g., Bruno and Sachs, 1985). The current model thus features a mixture of
nominal and real wage rigidity meant to capture in a stylized way the European
situation.3
Firms face a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with a ﬁxed capital
stock and with decreasing returns to scale in labor. Revenues in period t are taxed
at a rate τit. The demand for labor is determined by equating the real wage rate
with the (after-tax) marginal product of labor. Hence, (log) output in country i
in periods 1 and 2, respectively, amounts to (see Appendix A):
xi1 = ν (p1 − w1 − τi1)=ν (π1 − E0π1 − τi1), (1)
xi2 = ν (p2 − w2 − τi2)=ν (π2 − E0π2 − τi2), (2)
with ν>0. All union members experience the same inﬂation rate because the
world produces a single, perfectly substitutable good that is traded without barri-
8ers. This also implies that the real exchange rate between the union and the rest
of the world is constant and can be neglected.
Each country features a benevolent government, which thus shares the social
loss function of the public at large. In particular, the social loss function of country









t +( xit − ˜ xit)
2 + αg (git − ˜ git)
2¤
,α π,α g > 0. (3)
Welfare losses increase in the deviations of inﬂation, output and government
spending (git is government spending as a share of non-distortionary output,i . e .
output in the absence of distortionary taxes, inﬂation surprises and shocks) from
their ﬁrst-best levels (or “bliss points”). For convenience, the ﬁrst-best level for
inﬂation corresponds to price stability. The ﬁrst-best level for output is denoted
by ˜ xit > 0. Two distortions reduce output below this optimal level. First, the
output tax τit drives a wedge between the social and private beneﬁts of additional
output. Second, market power enables unions to drive the real wage above its
level in the absence of distortions. Hence, even in the absence of taxes, output is
below the ﬁrst-best output level ˜ xit > 0.As u b s i d y( τit < 0)i st h u sr e q u i r e dt o
arrive at the ﬁrst-best output level. The ﬁrst-best level of government spending,
9˜ git > 0, can be interpreted as the optimal share of non-distortionary output to
be spent on public goods if (non-distortionary) lump-sum taxes would have been
available. The ﬁrst-best levels for output and government spending can diﬀer
across countries. Parameters απ and αg correspond to the weights of the price
stability and government spending objectives, respectively, relative to the weight
of the output objective. To obtain tractable solutions, we assume that all member
countries feature the same relative weights. Finally, 0 <β≤ 1 denotes society’s
subjective discount factor.
Government i’s budget constraint can be approximated by (e.g., see Appendix
A in Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999):
git +( 1+ρ)di,t−1 = τit + dit, (4)
where di,t−1 represents the amount of public debt carried over from the previous
period into period t, while dit stands for the amount of debt outstanding at the
e n do fp e r i o dt ( b o t ha r ee x p r e s s e da sas h a r eo fn o n - d i s t o r t i o n a r yo u t p u t ) .A l l
public debt is real, matures after one period, and is sold on the world capital
market against a real rate of interest of ρ. This interest rate is exogenous because
the countries making up the monetary union are assumed to be small relative to
10the rest of the world. The government budget constraint abstracts from possible
seigniorage revenues, which seems realistic, because these revenues currently play
an almost negligible role in most EMU countries.4
We combine (4) with the expression for output, (1) or (2), to eliminate τit.T h e
resulting equations can be rewritten to yield the overall ﬁnancing requirements in
period t (OFRit), t =1 ,2:
OFRit ≡ Kit +( 1+ρ)di,t−1 − dit
=[ ( ˜ xit − xit)/ν]+(˜ git − git)+( πt − E0πt), (5)
where
Kit ≡ ˜ git +˜ xit/ν,
will be referred to as (total) structural distortions in period t .T h e o v e r a l l ﬁ-
nancing requirement, OFRit, consists of two components (see the ﬁrst right-hand
side of (5)). The ﬁrst component, Kit, amounts to the government spending tar-
get, ˜ git, and an output subsidy aimed at oﬀsetting the implicit output tax due to
labor- or product-market distortions, ˜ xit/ν. The second component involves net
debt-servicing costs, (1 + ρ)di,t−1 −dit. The last right-hand side of (5) represents
the ﬁnancing sources: the shortfall (scaled by ν) of output from its target (hence-
11f o r t hr e f e r r e dt oa st h eoutput shortfall), (˜ xit − xit)/ν, the shortfall of government
spending from its target (henceforth referred to as the spending shortfall), ˜ git−git,
and the inﬂation surprise, πt−E0πt.
All public debt is paid oﬀ at the end of the second period (di2 =0 ,i=1 ,..,n).
Under this assumption, while taking the discounted (to period 1 )s u m so ft h e
left- and right-hand sides of (5) over t =1and 2, we obtain the intertemporal





−(t−1)[(˜ xit − xit)/ν +(˜ git − git)+( πt − E0πt)], (6)
where
Fi ≡ Ki1 +( 1+ρ)di0 + Ki2/(1 + ρ)
serves as a comprehensive measure of all exogenous factors that result in losses
to society. In the sequel, we conveniently express the equilibrium outcomes of the
ﬁnancing sources in terms of this intertemporal overall ﬁnancing requirement.
Monetary policy is delegated to the ECB, which exercises direct control over
the union’s inﬂation rate. One could assume that the ECB features intrinsic pref-
erences regarding policy outcomes. Alternatively, and this is the interpretation
we prefer, the ECB can be assigned a loss function by means of an appropriate
12contractual agreement. More speciﬁcally, this agreement shapes the ECB’s incen-
tives in such a way (by appropriately specifying its salary and other beneﬁts — for
example, possible reappointment — conditional on its performance) that it chooses




















t is the inﬂation target imposed on the ECB in period t (as in Svensson,
1997). It may be diﬀerent from the ﬁrst-best inﬂation rate (which was assumed to
be zero). The ECB cares about stabilizing output around its ﬁrst-best level; the
relative weight that the ECB attaches to deviations of inﬂation from its assigned
target coincides with the corresponding relative weight of society and, thus, the
ﬁscal authorities. Credibly delegating monetary policy to a central bank that does
not care about ﬂuctuations in output would be diﬃcult in practice. Indeed, in the
presence of shocks, society optimally assigns an output objective to the central
bank in order to stabilize output. The previous version of this paper (Beetsma
and Bovenberg, 2001) allowed for supply-side shocks in output (1). In order to
save notation, we abstract from shocks here because all major results continue to
hold in the absence of stochastic shocks.
133. The second-best: full commitment
As a benchmark for the remainder of the analysis, this section discusses the equi-
librium if all policymakers (monetary and ﬁscal) are able to commit their policy
instruments. The precise timing is as follows. First, at the start of the ﬁrst pe-
riod, the ECB announces and commits to inﬂation for both periods ahead.A tt h e
same moment, the ﬁscal authorities announce their commitment to a particular
set of debt levels. This eliminates the commitment problem facing ﬁscal pol-
icy described in the introduction and internalizes international spillovers. Second,
nominal wage contracts are set for both periods. Third, public spending and taxes
are determined, while inﬂation and debt are set at the announced levels. Then,
at the start of the second period, the nominal wage is updated for unexpected
inﬂation incurred in the ﬁrst period. Finally, the second-period policy variables
are determined, with inﬂation set at the originally announced value and public
spending and taxes set under the restriction that all debt be paid oﬀ. Although
the second-period nominal wage is indexed for inﬂation during the ﬁrst period,
second-period inﬂation expectations are not updated at the start of the second
period.
In the sequel, we refer to this equilibrium as the second-best equilibrium.I nt h e
14absence of ﬁrst-best policies (such as the use of lump-sum taxation and the elim-
ination of product- and labor-market distortions), this equilibrium features the
smallest possible expected welfare loss for each individual country in a monetary
union (i.e., given that inﬂation is attuned to union-wide circumstances).
The derivation of the second-best equilibrium can be found in Appendix B.
T a b l e1c o n t a i n st h eo u t c o m e sf o ri n ﬂation, the output shortfall and the spending
shortfall.6 The factor between square brackets in each of the outcomes makes
clear how, within ag i v e np e r i o d ,Fi is distributed over the ﬁnancing sources (the
output shortfall, the spending shortfall and an inﬂation surprise), while the factor
in round brackets regulates the intertemporal allocation of Fi.I n d e e d ,s u m m i n g
over the ﬁnancing sources for each given period (see the right-hand side of (5),
t =1 ,2), we ﬁnd that the factors in square brackets add up to unity. As regards
the intertemporal allocation, ﬁrst-period ﬁnancing sources together absorb a share
of β
∗ (1 + ρ)/[1 + β
∗ (1 + ρ)] of Fi, while second-period ﬁnancing sources together
absorb a share (discounted to the ﬁrst period) of 1/[1 + β
∗ (1 + ρ)].H e r e ,a n di n
the sequel, β
∗ ≡ β (1 + ρ).




[Ki1 +( 1+ρ)di0 − Ki2]+( 1− β
∗)Ki2
1+β
∗ (1 + ρ)
, (8)
15where the superscript “S” stands for “second-best equilibrium”. If structural
distortions are constant through time (i.e. Ki1 = Ki2), initial public debt is
absent (di0 =0 ) , and the interest rate equals the discount rate (i.e. 1/β =( 1+ρ)
so that β
∗ =1 ) , public debt remains zero as structural distortions are absorbed
in the period in which they occur. Relatively high ﬁrst-period distortions (i.e.
Ki1 >K i2), initial public debt (di0 > 0), and the discount rate exceeding the
interest rate (i.e. 1/β > (1 + ρ) so that β
∗ < 1) contribute to positive public
debt. All these factors encourage governments to shift some of their ﬁrst-period
ﬁnancing requirements to the second period through public debt policy.
4. Pure discretion
This section explores the case of pure discretion, that is, discretionary monetary
and ﬁscal policymaking in the absence of inﬂation targets (π∗
1 = π∗
2 =0 ) and debt
targets.7 In contrast to the previous section, therefore, policymakers are no longer
able to commit.
The timing of events is now as follows. At the start of the ﬁrst period (t =0 ),
nominal wages are set (and inﬂation expectations are determined) for both periods
ahead. Subsequently, the ﬁrst-period monetary and ﬁscal policy instruments are
chosen, where each policymaker takes the other players’ ﬁrst-period policy deci-
16sions, as well as expectations, as given. Then, the nominal wage for the second
period is indexed for unexpected inﬂation incurred over the ﬁrst period. Finally,
second-period monetary and ﬁscal policy instruments are chosen, where, again,
each policymaker takes the other players’ policy decisions, as well as expectations,
as given. In other words, within each period, policymakers are involved in a Nash
game. Fiscal policy typically has a ﬁrst-mover advantage vis-à-vis monetary pol-
icy because the latter can be changed more easily. However, a monetary union
strengthens the strategic position of monetary policy, as the central monetary au-
thority faces many relatively small ﬁscal authorities. The Nash assumption within
each period thus seems a reasonable description of the stronger strategic position
of the monetary authorities.8
Since they move earlier, ﬁrst-period governments act as Stackelberg leaders
against the second-period policymakers. This gives rise to strategic eﬀects as
ﬁrst-period governments exploit the second-period reaction function of the mon-
etary authorities. In particular, by using their debt policy, ﬁrst-period ﬁscal pol-
icymakers aﬀect the need for tax revenues and thus the tax rate in the second
period. This, in turn, impacts output (and employment) and thus the incentive























w h e r ef o rf u t u r er e f e r e n c ew eh a v ea l l o w e df o ran o n - z e r oi n ﬂation target π∗
2.
Higher expected inﬂation and more severe tax and non-tax distortions in any of
the countries in the monetary union reduce output below its target level, thereby
inducing the ECB to employ unanticipated inﬂa t i o na sa ni n s t r u m e n tt oe x p a n d
output. The eﬀect on inﬂation of a unilateral change in the tax rate is only 1/n-th
of the corresponding eﬀect under national monetary policymaking. Accordingly,
the reaction of the ECB to an individual country’s change in its tax rate decreases
with the size of the union. Intuitively, the larger a monetary union becomes, the
weaker becomes the strategic position of each individual ﬁscal player.
Table 2 contains the solutions for the inﬂation rate, the output shortfall and
the spending shortfall.9 In contrast to the second best (see Table 1), inﬂation is
no longer zero, owing to the inability to commit to a tight monetary policy. The
outcomes deviate from those in the second best also because debt accumulation
diﬀers from second-best accumulation if countries are heterogeneous. To clearly
show the impact of heterogeneity, we write the solutions (see also Table 2) as the
18sum of a response to the cross-country average component, ¯ F, of the intertemporal
overall ﬁnancing requirement and a response to its country-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t ,
ˆ Fi. Formally, ¯ F ≡ (1/n)
Pn
j=1 Fj and ˆ Fi ≡ Fi− ¯ F.I nt h es e q u e l ,a n yv a r i a b l ew i t h
an upperbar denotes an average, and any variable with a hat denotes the country-
speciﬁc component. Government i’s debt, for example, can now be written as
d
D
i1 = ¯ d
D


















ˆ Ki1 +( 1+ρ) ˆ di0 − ˆ Ki2
i
+[ 1− β
∗ (P∗/P)] ˆ Ki2
1+β
∗ (1 + ρ)(P∗/P)
, (12)
and a superscript “D” is used to indicate that this is the purely discretionary
solution and where
P ≡ 1/απ +1 /ν
2 +1 /αg,P
∗ ≡ [(n − 1)/n]/απ +1 /ν
2 +1 /αg. (13)
While the debt response to the average components ¯ K1, ¯ K2 and ¯ d0 of the
19intertemporal overall ﬁnancing requirement is the same as under the second best
(so that ¯ dD
1 = ¯ dS
1 ), the responses to the idiosyncratic components diﬀer, as shown
by a comparison between (8) and (12). International heterogeneity, as captured by
cross-country diﬀerences in the intertemporal overall ﬁnancing requirement, gives
r i s et oac o n ﬂict among the ﬁscal authorities about the preferred future monetary
policy stance. The conﬂict induces governments to employ debt strategically
in order to manipulate future monetary policy to their own advantage. As a
result, ˆ dD
i1 diﬀers from ˆ dS
i1. In particular, countries featuring a relatively large
intertemporal overall ﬁnancing requirement (i.e. ˆ Fi > 0) accumulate excessive
public debt (i.e. ˆ dD
i1 > ˆ dS
i1). Countries featuring a relatively small intertemporal
overall ﬁnancing requirement (i.e. ˆ Fi < 0), in contrast, do not accumulate enough
public debt (i.e. ˆ dD
i1 < ˆ dS
i1).10
The intuition for these results is as follows. Countries with a relatively large
ﬁnancing requirement ˆ Fi > 0 need to raise relatively large tax revenues. Their
governments realize that raising public debt to shift more of the tax burden to
the second period beneﬁts ﬁrst-period employment, while the adverse impact on
second-period employment is only limited, because the higher second-period tax
rate induces the ECB to relax monetary policy in that period in order to pro-
tect employment (see (9)). Hence, these governments perceive a relatively large
20beneﬁt from exploiting the predetermination (at the start of the ﬁrst period) of
second-period inﬂation expectations in this way and, therefore, strategically over-
accumulate debt (compared to the second best). Through the same mechanism,
governments of countries with ˆ Fi < 0 strategically underaccumulate debt in order
to encourage the ECB to reduce future inﬂation. Of course, the combined eﬀect
of the conﬂicting eﬀorts of individual governments to inﬂuence the ECB is nil.
If the number of countries, n,i n c r e a s e s ,ˆ dD
i1 tends towards ˆ dS
i1. The reason
is that, in a larger union, an individual country realizes that it can exert only
a small inﬂuence on the common inﬂa t i o nr a t e( s e e( 9 ) ) .T h ep e r c e i v e db e n e ﬁts
from using debt strategically are therefore small.
5. Ex-ante and ex-post policy coordination
This section explores reforms of monetary and ﬁscal institutions aimed at improv-
ing upon the purely discretionary equilibrium considered in the previous section.
In particular, we consider inﬂation targets (π∗
1 and π∗
2) and debt targets, which are
determined prior to the setting of nominal wages at the beginning of the ﬁrst pe-
riod. These targets can be interpreted as an intermediate step between complete
commitment to inﬂation and debt rules in Section 3 and pure discretion considered
in Section 4. They are in fact contractual solutions allowing the policymakers to
21commit to particular contracts before the private sector takes its decisions. These
contracts, which attempt to internalize policy spillovers, can be viewed as ex-ante
coordination among policymakers.
Throughout this section, we assume that monetary policy is ex ante coordi-
nated by means of inﬂation targets. Indeed, various countries, such as the U.K.,
Canada and New Zealand, have adopted inﬂation targets. The ECB has an-
nounced a target range for inﬂation of 0 − 2 %f o rt h em e d i u mt e r m . T h e s e
arrangements strengthen the commitment of monetary authorities to not exploit
nominal contracts concluded in the private sector. Countries typically ﬁnd it
harder to agree on constraints on ﬁscal policy than on monetary institutions. In-
deed, negotiating the Stability and Growth Pact was considerably more diﬃcult
than agreeing on the appropriate design of the ECB. Moreover, the credibility of
the Stability and Growth Pact cannot be taken for granted due to serious enforce-
ment problems, especially in a monetary union between sovereign countries. In
view of these considerations and our focus on ﬁscal policy, this section explores
three alternative options for ﬁscal policy, namely (1) ex-ante coordination on the
basis of debt targets; (2) ex-post coordination between the ﬁscal authorities; (3)
the absence of any ﬁscal coordination. Sub-section 5.1 considers ex-post ﬁscal
coordination, where ﬁscal authorities bargain about contracts after the private
22sector has formed expectations and incorporated these expectations into nominal
wage contracts. This case clearly isolates the conﬂict between monetary and ﬁscal
policy authorities. Indeed, ex-post ﬁscal coordination corresponds to the case of
a single country with uncoordinated national ﬁscal and monetary policies. By
abstracting from ex-post ﬁscal coordination, sub-section 5.2 explores the case of
strategic interaction between one central bank and several homogeneous decen-
tralized ﬁscal authorities in a monetary union. Sub-section 5.3 introduces conﬂicts
between the various ﬁscal authorities by allowing for heterogeneous countries.
5.1. Ex-post ﬁscal coordination by homogeneous countries
Under ex-post coordination, governments jointly select their full set of ﬁscal poli-
cies (tax rates, spending levels and debt levels) in order to minimize an equally-






23taking private-sector inﬂation expectations as given. Public debt (see Appendix
D for the derivation) is now given by
d
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2, ∀i, where S ≡ 1/ν
2 +1 /αg, (15)
where superscript “F”i su s e dt od e n o t ee x - p o s tc o o r d i n a t i o n . A tight second-
period inﬂation target (i.e. π∗
2 < 0), which combats inﬂation, boosts debt ac-
cumulation compared to the second best. The reason is that such an inﬂation
target creates a policy conﬂict between the monetary and the coordinated ﬁscal
authorities, by reducing the preferred inﬂation rate of the ECB below that of
the ﬁscal authorities. Intuitively, monetary policy is decided at an earlier stage
(at the contracting stage via the inﬂation target) than discretionary ﬁscal policy.
This conﬂict between monetary and ﬁscal policy induces the ﬁscal authorities to
raise public debt strategically.11 In particular, higher future tax rates required to
service a larger public debt reduce output and employment and, with inﬂation
expectations given, encourage the ECB to relax monetary policy (see (9)).
In view of these strategic eﬀects, inﬂation targets alone are not suﬃcient to
ensure the second-best outcome. In order to avoid a debt bias, a tight inﬂation
target needs to be complemented with a ceiling on the public debt. Intuitively,
24by providing some commitment to not only monetary policy (through credible
inﬂation targets) but also ﬁscal policy (through credible debt ceilings), one coor-
dinates monetary and ﬁscal policies by eliminating the conﬂict between the two.
The following proposition (proven in Appendix E) states the suﬃcient institu-
tional arrangements to reproduce the second best.
Proposition 1. Suppose that countries are homogeneous, so that Ki1 = ¯ K1,







































combined with a uniform (across countries) debt target dT
i1 = ¯ dS
1,∀i, ensure that
the discretionary equilibrium coincides with the second-best equilibrium.
Here, and in the sequel, we use a superscript “T ”t od e n o t ead e b tt a r g e t ,
which should be hit exactly (but eﬀectively acts as a debt ceiling here). The
inﬂation targets (16) and (17) ensure that, for given debt policy, the intratemporal
trade-oﬀ among the instruments is optimal. The targets are negative, which may
seem unrealistic in the light of actual inﬂation-targeting experience. The negative
25targets are the result of our assumption that society’s bliss point for inﬂation is
zero. If society’s bliss point for inﬂation is positive, then also the optimal inﬂation
targets can be positive. Moreover, in practice inﬂation targets are imposed on
measured inﬂation, which tends to exceed actual inﬂation because it does not
properly account for quality improvements of products. Hence, a positive target
for measured inﬂation may correspond to negative actual inﬂation. In any case,
what matters here are the qualitative properties of the optimal inﬂation targets
(16) and (17). In particular, they eliminate inﬂation (i.e. E0π1 =E0π2 =0 ) .T h e
inﬂation targets are proportional to the average intertemporal overall ﬁnancing
requirement, ¯ F. A larger value for ¯ F requires a tighter inﬂation target to guarantee
price stability.
As argued above, debt ceilings are diﬃcult to implement in practice. In the
absence of such ceilings, the additional debt accumulation produced by a tight
second-period inﬂation target (π∗
2 < 0 — see (15)) raises the overall ﬁnancing
requirement in the second period. In order to oﬀset the resulting inﬂation in
the second period, the second-period inﬂation target has to be tighter than the
corresponding inﬂation target in the presence of optimal debt targets. The optimal
inﬂation target, however, does not completely eliminate second-period inﬂation
(due to more debt accumulation). Marginally relaxing an inﬂation target that
26completely eliminates inﬂation produces a ﬁrst-order gain in welfare on account
of a reduced debt bias. At the same time, it produces only a second-order loss
of welfare on account of an emerging inﬂation bias. The following proposition
(proven in Appendix F) makes this precise:
Proposition 2. Assume homogeneous countries and ex-post ﬁscal coordination.
In the absence of debt targets, the combination of ﬁrst- and second-period inﬂation









2 . Here, π∗∗
2 lies between π∗∗∗
2 and π
∗,opt
2 (17), where π∗∗∗
2 (<π
∗,opt
2 )i st h e
second-period inﬂation target that completely eliminates second-period inﬂation
in the absence of debt targets. Finally, ¯ d∗∗




With optimal inﬂation targets being the only ex-ante arrangement, the second
best is not attained. The ﬁrst-period inﬂation target, which completely eliminates
the ﬁrst-period inﬂation bias, needs to be less tight than in the presence of optimal
debt targets. The reason is that public debt is higher so that the ﬁrst-period overall
ﬁnancing requirement (which determines ﬁrst-period inﬂation) is lower.
275.2. Homogeneous countries with decentralized ﬁscal policies
In this sub-section, ﬁscal authorities no longer engage in ex-post ﬁscal coordina-
tion, but countries are still homogeneous (i.e. Ki1 = ¯ K1 , Ki2 = ¯ K2 and di0 = ¯ d0,
∀i) so that international ﬁscal conﬂicts are absent. Without ﬁscal coordination,
public debt policy is given by











Decentralization of ﬁscal policymaking weakens the ﬁscal authorities in their
strategic conﬂict with the ECB about future monetary policy. Hence, unless
n =1(in which case the solution coincides with that under ex-post ﬁscal coor-
dination), a tight inﬂation target (π∗
2 < 0) gives rise to less additional strategic
debt accumulation than under ex-post ﬁscal coordination (compare (18) for n>1
with (15)). In the absence of ex-post ﬁscal coordination, ﬁscal authorities realize
that an individual country boosting public debt exerts only a 1/n-eﬀect on the
common monetary policy. This weakens the incentive to raise public debt when a
tight inﬂation target is imposed. Although strategic debt accumulation is reduced
compared to the case with ex-post ﬁscal coordination, the following proposition
(proven in Appendix E) states that the same debt targets are still required to
28complement tight inﬂation targets in reproducing the second best.
Proposition 3. Assume homogeneous countries and decentralized ﬁscal policy-
making. Then, imposing the set of inﬂation targets (16) and (17) and the set
of uniform debt targets dT
i1 = ¯ dS
1,∀i, ensures that the discretionary equilibrium
coincides with the second-best equilibrium.
In the realistic case that ex-ante ﬁscal coordination through debt targets is not
feasible, ex-post ﬁscal coordination is counterproductive. The reason is that the
ﬁscal authorities internalize the mutually beneﬁcial externalities of increasing their
debt. This intensiﬁes the conﬂict between the ECB and the ﬁscal authorities as a
group. Finally, it is easy to show that, without any form of ﬁscal coordination (ex
ante or ex post), the optimal inﬂation targets are given by Proposition 2, where
¯ d∗∗
1 is now the right-hand side of (18) obtained after substituting π∗∗
2 for π∗
2.12
5.3. Heterogeneous countries with decentralized ﬁscal policies
If countries are heterogeneous, institutional constraints must not only combat
inﬂation but also address wasteful strategic debt policies due to conﬂicting views
of the various governments about the proper stance of monetary policy. The
optimal inﬂation targets again eliminate inﬂation (i.e. E0π1 = E0π2 =0 )and
29coincide with the targets in the previous two cases. Optimal debt targets must
prevent the strategic debt accumulation that arises not only from the conﬂict
between the ECB and the ﬁscal authorities about the preferred inﬂation rate
but also from the conﬂict between the various ﬁscal authorities themselves, as
described in Section 4. In order to resolve this latter conﬂict, the debt targets
have to be country speciﬁc. Hence, the optimal debt targets must be richer than
in the case of homogeneous countries. The following proposition (the proof of
which is very similar to that of Proposition 1) makes this precise:
Proposition 4. Assume decentralized ﬁscal policymaking with heterogeneous
countries. The set of inﬂation targets (16) and (17) combined with a set of
country-speciﬁc debt targets dT
i1 = dS
i1,∀i , given by (8) ensure that the discre-
tionary equilibrium coincides with the second-best equilibrium.





































30Ex-post ﬁscal coordination eliminates the strategic debt accumulation due to in-
ternational conﬂicts between the ﬁscal authorities about the common monetary
policy. The country-speciﬁc debt component therefore coincides with its second-
best counterpart, as shown by the last term of (20). In assessing the desirability
of the ex-post coordination of ﬁscal policies, this beneﬁcial eﬀect needs to be
traded oﬀ against the more intense strategic conﬂict between the ECB and the
ﬁscal authorities as a group, which is reﬂected in the absence of the 1/n term in
front of the term in round brackets at the right-hand side of (20). Hence, ex-post
coordination is harmful if this conﬂict is especially serious compared to the in-
ternational conﬂict among the various ﬁscal policymakers. This is the case if the
inﬂation target π∗
2 is tight due to a large cross-country average of the intertemporal
overall ﬁnancing requirements on account of serious structural distortions, while
a tt h es a m et i m ei n t e r n a t i o n a ld i ﬀerences in the intertemporal overall ﬁnancing
requirement are only small (so that the terms ˆ dD
i1 and ˆ dS
i1 are small in absolute
value).
As before, in the absence of any form of ﬁscal coordination, the optimal in-
ﬂation targets are given by Proposition 2, where ¯ d∗∗
1 is now the term in square
brackets on the right-hand side of (19) obtained after substituting (the new —
s e eF o o t n o t e1 2—v a l u eo f )π∗∗
2 for π∗
2. The optimal second-period inﬂation tar-
31get is a compromise, because with heterogeneity, countries diﬀer in their preferred
second-period inﬂation target. In particular, a country i featuring relatively severe
structural distortions (i.e., ˆ Fi > 0) prefers a relatively lax second-period inﬂation
target (i.e., it prefers π∗
2 >π ∗∗
2 ). The reason is that in the presence of such a lax
inﬂation target the country does not have to engage in costly strategic debt ac-
cumulation to encourage the ECB to raise second-period inﬂation. The opposite
holds true for a country i with relatively minor structural distortions ( ˆ Fi < 0). It
prefers a relatively tight target so that it does not need to strategically underac-
cumulate debt.
6. Conclusion
This paper has explored the scope for policy coordination in the EMU. Waste-
ful strategic debt policy may arise from conﬂicts about the preferred stance of
monetary policy both between the ECB and the ﬁscal authorities and between
heterogeneous ﬁscal authorities themselves. How severe these conﬂicts are de-
pends crucially on monetary institutions and structural distortions. The conﬂict
between the ECB and the ﬁscal authorities is especially harmful if labor-market
rigidities and high distortionary taxes give rise to widespread unemployment, if
the ECB pursues tight monetary policies aimed at price stability, and if nomi-
32nal contracts and ﬁscal policies are set at diﬀerent points in time. The conﬂicts
between the various decentralized governments are most serious if countries are
heterogeneous in terms of labor-market distortions and public spending. Also
here the fact that nominal contracts and ﬁscal policy are set at diﬀerent points in
time is crucial. In these circumstances, governments employ their debt policies to
exploit the inﬂation expectations incorporated in nominal contracts.
Strategic debt accumulation can be alleviated in various complementary ways.
Of course, one option is to pursue structural policies aimed at cutting high equi-
librium unemployment. However, in terms of political feasibility, this option is
also most diﬃcult to implement and, therefore, has not been explored in the pre-
ceding analysis. Another way to avoid strategic debt accumulation is ex-ante
policy coordination among all policy authorities. In particular, commitment to
contracts in the form of inﬂation targets for the ECB and debt targets for the
ﬁscal authorities can eliminate strategic debt policy altogether. Partial ex-ante
coordination combined with partial ex-post coordination, however, may be un-
desirable. In particular, if only the ECB is committed to an ex-ante contract in
t h ef o r mo fa ni n ﬂation target, ex-post coordination among ﬁscal authorities may
be harmful because it exacerbates the conﬂict between the ECB and the ﬁscal
authorities about the proper stance of monetary policy. From time to time it is
33suggested to strengthen the Eurogroup as a vehicle for the ex-post coordination
of ﬁscal policies and to act as a political counterweight to the ECB. In the light
of our results this may be undesirable, especially if structural unemployment in
Europe remains high, nominal wage contracts are rigid, and enforcement of the
Stability and Growth Pact remains in doubt.
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37Footnotes
1. For recent work on the coordination of monetary and/or ﬁscal policies, see
e.g. Jensen (1996), Dixon and Santoni (1997) and Debrun (2001). These
papers do not investigate how international policy coordination aﬀects public
debt accumulation, which is a key issue addressed in this paper.
2. We could allow for a real wage target that deviates from zero and that
diﬀers across the two periods (see Appendix A). Non-zero wage targets would
then show up in our measure for structural distortions (see below) without
aﬀecting the rest of the analysis.
3. Burda (1999) argues that real wage rigidity is likely to become less relevant
for the Euro area in the future. At the same time, nominal price rigidities
may become more important.
4. The implicit assumption is that real money holdings, which are the main
source of seigniorage revenues, are zero. Indeed, due to eﬃcient payments
and transaction systems, real base money holdings are small in advanced
economies.
5. The outcomes would be completely unaltered if we included government
38spending in the ECB’s loss function (7). For convenience, and because it
seems more realistic, we do not include government spending in (7).
6. Throughout, we present the outcome for the output shortfall instead of the
tax rate. The reason is that, in contrast to the latter, the former directly
enters the loss functions.
7. In much of the literature on ﬁscal-monetary policy interactions, only mon-
etary policy is discretionary (e.g. Alesina and Tabellini, 1986). Exceptions
are, for example, Bryson et al. (1993), Agell et al. (1996), Begg (2000),
Debrun (2000) and Dixit and Lambertini (2000).
8. Dixit and Lambertini (2000) explore various leadership assumptions in a one-
period model with ﬁscal-monetary policy interactions. Interestingly, they
ﬁnd that monetary commitment becomes irrelevant for the outcomes if the
monetary authority is a Stackelberg leader. With the ﬁscal reaction function
included as a constraint in the monetary authority’s optimization problem,
the constraint that expectations be rationally formed becomes redundant,
thereby eliminating the value to the central bank of having control over
private sector expectations. In our model, the outcomes under monetary
discretion diﬀer from those under monetary commitment because of two
39reasons. First, the monetary authorities are not Stackelberg leaders vis-
à-vis the ﬁscal authorities. Second, we consider a dynamic rather than a
static game in which ﬁscal policy aﬀects inﬂation only indirectly, namely
through the ECB’s second-period reaction function (see (9) below). Dixit
and Lambertini (2000), in contrast, assume that ﬁscal policy aﬀects inﬂation
directly and instantaneously.
9. The complete derivation of the equilibrium is contained in Appendix C.
10. These results follow formally by observing that ∂ ˆ dD
i1/∂n is positive (negative)
if ˆ Fi < (>)0 , while ˆ dD
i1 → ˆ dS
i1, as n →∞ .
11. This conﬂict occurs also in a single country with uncoordinated national
monetary and ﬁscal authorities. Indeed, ex-post coordination can be inter-
preted as a monetary authority interacting with a single ﬁscal authority.
12. Since π∗∗
2 and π∗∗∗
2 depend on n,t h e yd i ﬀer from their values under ex-post
ﬁscal coordination.
40Table 1. Second-best policy outcomes
First period Second period
π1 =0 π2 =0
























π1− E0π1 =0 π2− E0π2 =0
Note: πt is the inﬂation rate in period t, (˜ xit − xit)/ν is the (scaled) shortfall of
output from target, ˜ git −git is the shortfall of spending from target, and Fi is the
intertemporal overall ﬁnancing requirement (6). Further, ν is the slope of the
supply curves (1) and (2), αg is the relative weight of the government spending
objective in (3), and β
∗ ≡ β (1 + ρ),w h e r eβ is the subjective discount factor
and ρ is the real interest rate. Finally, c0 ≡ (1 + ρ)/[1 + β
∗ (1 + ρ)] and
S ≡ 1/ν2 +1 /αg.
41Table 2. P u r e l yd i s c r e t i o n a r yp o l i c yo u t c o m e s






































































π1− E0π1 =0 π2− E0π2 =0
Note: ¯ F ≡ (1/n)
Pn
j=1 Fj is the cross-country average overall ﬁnancing
requirement and ˆ Fi ≡ Fi − ¯ F is country i’s speciﬁc component. Further, απ is
t h er e l a t i v ew e i g h to ft h ei n ﬂation objective in (3) and (7). Finally,
c1 ≡ (1 + ρ)/[1 + β
∗ (1 + ρ)(P∗/P)],P≡ 1/απ +1 /ν2 +1 /αg and
P ∗ ≡ [(n − 1)/n](1/απ)+1 /ν2 +1 /αg. For the other deﬁnitions, see Table 1.
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